Essay: Does Islamic Revivalism Undermine Arab Borders?

This is an Undergraduate Essay, written in my third year.

The modern Islamic revival effort has espoused a core principle of action: the return to the caliphate. However, this dysfunctional political premise has encountered numerous problems throughout history; this paper will attempt to prove that Islamic revivalism will thrive within national borders and not under the notion of a caliphate. The evidence will be expressed by emphasising three examples: The caliphate functioned under divided sub-states and never proved to be a united entity; globalisation and the spread of international law has stifled calls for the caliphate and; the reinvention of revivalist parties within the constraints of democracy.

The idea of Islamic resurgence is a manifestation of the prophetic statement that God will send a reviver of the religion at the turn of every century.[1]  The classical motivation for revival as John Esposito indicates was to arrest a moral decline, but it was also used as response against colonisation.[2] The latter gained prominence after the official collapse of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924; groups such as the Khilafat movement expressed an immediate intention to re-establish the caliphate. More recently, this Islamic endeavour has reconsolidated its efforts citing the failure of numerous nation states which replaced the caliphate.[3] The nationalist movements in Indonesia and Iran for example, were seen as iconic failures in addressing the concerns of political stagnancy in Muslim countries.[4] Sayyid Qutb and Hassan Al Banna were seen as advocates of a sharia (Islamic law) compliant state whereby the prominence of God’s governance abrogated all other rules of law. Therefore the only satisfactory remedy, according to Islamists, was to re-establish the Islamic Empire.

The downfall of the call to reinvigorate an Islamic state is the inability to administer itself under one wholly unified body. The sheer scale of the Islamic empire, like other empires before it, demonstrated weak central governance. Albert Hourani infers that during the Ummayad dynasty the rapid expansion of the state led to problems in governance and the eventual compromising of power.[5] Mustafa Kemal, the late President of Turkey, referred to the Islamic caliphate as an unworkable system due to the vastness of the empire.[6]

It is a misnomer to presume that the caliphate was without fractious relationships; in fact, these self-interest and sectarian based differences had become apparent within a few generations of the death of the Prophet Muhammad.[7] The proliferation of this divisive mentality would cause an eventual division of power and the utopian idea of the rule of God under His vicegerent had become warped. There is a vast array of evidence to suggest that the empire operated with a decentralised authority. In the 10th century (CE) the Muslims had effectively created three near-autocratic regions, in Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba.[8] In another example, the precursor to revival during the time of Saladin required a unification of the faithful, not in belief but in administration.[9] After Saladin’s ascendency to Sultan, the efforts of uniting numerous regions demonstrated that governance was divided across various Arab regions and that these regions were defined by loose borders. As a reconsolidation of the fact that nation states were the norm, John Darwin adds that in the period following the death of Tamerlane and his vast empire, power reverted back to nation states.[10] Therefore, history has shown an apparent inclination towards division, indicating that the caliphate worked principally as a conglomerate of numerous nation states in all matters but self determination.

The existence of a common bond is used to argue against regional divisions. Nevertheless, both ummah (Islamic community) and ikwah (brotherhood) merely imply that there is a link between partisans of the faith. Feldman notes that the ummah was established from a unified belief and disassociation from tribalism.[11] Allawi affirms that borders can easily be transcended to reflect a common bond between Muslims.[12] However, despite this Koranic emphasis that, “the Muslims are one brotherhood,[13] the concept did not stifle civil war or rivalries within the Muslim population. A common bond does not necessitate the creation of a new, independent, Islamically-governed state.

Western empires employ a similar common denominator in the Kantian theory of democratic peace which states that democratic nations rarely engage in war with each other. This concept of perpetual peace has spread throughout the world through globalisation and has become an integral ideal.[14] The global idea is ever changing, especially given its influence of rapid change in economic markets and spread of ideas. There are common features of globalisation that have had an impact on the revivalist movement and these are:

  1. A single global market which has created interdependency between states;
  2. The spread of media outlets and information has helped converge on global ideas as opposed to regional preferences;
  3. Diplomatic relations between states have become more accessible and bureaucratically quicker and;
  4. Large levels of migration have interrupted a wealth of cultural ideas to propagate shared values. [15]

Globalisation has come as a huge blow to the concept of brotherhood. The spread of information, commercial proliferation and international law has helped to establish a new uniformed international character. The treaties of Westphalia reinforced the concept of the state as having internal and external legitimacy. The idea of sovereignty has changed since the end of the cold war. International imperatives introduced in the 2005 World Summit[16] compel the nation with responsibility over its citizens.[17] Failure to comply could result in military intervention by the international community.[18] The right to self determination needs to pass stringent tests in order for a state to be established. A combination of these legal advances effectively reduces the potential for the growth of a new independent Islamic state. In the event that a caliphate is established, the international community will stringently assess its ability to protect its people, therefore its sovereignty will constantly be undermined.

Conservative revivalist movements consider globalisation as an extension of imperial or colonial values. The fact that this is more an expression of the west[19] rather than a true sharing of values, means that some Islamic movements are likely to reject its overtures.[20] Sayyid Qutb categorised the world into two fragments; belief in Islam and adherence to it or jahilliya[21] (a state of ignorance). This idea has reinforced the arguments of Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ which amplifies the division of cultures between the East and the West.

In contrast, the recent developments of Islamic movements have proven that there is adequate room to manoeuvre. There has been a seismic political shift by Islamic revivalist parties in the Arab region. The move towards a democratic alternative has proved to be another significant blow towards conservative revivalist movements. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have attempted to engage in democratic elections in Palestine and Egypt respectively proving that a transition can be made into mainstream politics.[22] The tone of Noah Feldman’s assertion seems to be one of scepticism when mentioning the motives of Islamic parties partaking in democratic methods. Further to that, another debate which centres on the compatibility of Islam and democracy is one that has been reconciled in many Arab regions.[23]

Two theoretical evidences may suggest that the traditional structure of the state is inclined towards the nation state. According to El Effendi, Ibn Khuldun writes in his Al-Muqadimat that religion does not form the basis of social order; he adds that religion can have two impacts on a state; to reinforce or to erode. The conclusion to this idea is added by Abdel Wahab El-Effendi himself by stating that prophets cannot achieve success without asabiyya (nationalism).[24]

Revivalism has clearly adapted to its environment in some force, though clearly with strong Islamic undertones. Popularity of democratically elected Islamist regimes has surged substantially and successes in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Palestine indicate a huge shift in the psyche of the Muslim population.[25] This is a clear indication of the movement towards the western normative of democracy and the cultural norms of the Arab region. Furthermore, this shift has mobilised Islam as a proponent of democratic rule whereas it was previously deemed unable to develop. Islamic tendency could quite easily shift from supporting the call for the caliphate to supporting a democratised Islam as a modern alternative to the failures of pan-Arabian nationalism.

It appears as though the natural disposition of the Islamic revival is constrained within the confines of nation states. Historic evidence suggests that fractured, self governing sub-states removed executive powers away from the central government during the Islamic Caliphate. The suggestion is that revival cannot move beyond friendly borders, it has never operated in such a manner. It would be impractical for any modern revival effort to assume power without establishing a central base from which it can expand. To date, no autonomous region within the Arab provinces has been created, neither has it succeeded with self-determination and even if it tried, international law would probably restrict it from doing so. This leads to The Westphalian imperative which has effectively sanctified borders; this and other international law edicts have created little opportunity to challenge national boundaries.

Democratic parties are inherently national based organisations that do not transcend borders. Modern revivalist groups have reasserted themselves as national movements with significant religious influences. The shift towards Islamic democratic politics has proved successful for parties like Hamas and Hizbullah and they have helped to redefine Islamic revivalist movements. All of these points indicate that Islamic revivalism operates within the confines of nationalism.

Perhaps the best portrayal of Islamic revivalist development within borders is expressed by James Gelvin:

Other transnational religions have become the wellspring of territorial nationalisms… It only stands to reason, therefore, that their Islam would conform to such a world as well.[26]




Allawi, A. (2009) The Crisis of the Islamic Civilization, Yale University Press, London.

Baylis, J., Owens, P., Smith, S. (2008) The Globalization of World Politics- An Introduction to International Relations– 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Darwin, J. (2007) After Tamerlane, Penguin Books, London.

Ed-Din, B. (2002) Saladin, Adam Publishers, New Delhi.

Eickelman, D. & Piscatori, J. (2004) Muslim Politics [2nd Edition], Princeton University Press, Oxfordshire.

El-Effendi, A. (2008) Who Needs an Islamic State? [2nd Edition], Malaysia Think Tank, London.

Esposito, J. (1991) Islam and Politics [3rd Edition], Syracuse University Press, New York

Feldman, N. (2004) After Jihad, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York.

Feldman, N. (2008) The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, Princeton University Press, Oxford.

Hourani, A. (1993) A History of Arab Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) ‘The Responsibility to Protect,’


Gelvin J. (2010) ‘Nationalism, Anarchism, Reform: Political Islam from Inside Out,’ Middle East Policy, Vol.17/3, pp. 118-133

Sadiki, L. (2010) ‘Reframing Resistance & Democracy- Narratives from Hamas & Hizbullah,’ Democratization, Vol. 17/2, pp. 350-376

Soage, A. (2009) ‘Hassan al Banna & Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?’The Muslim World, Vol. 99, pp. 294-311

[1] Sunan Abi Dawud

[2] Esposito J., (1991) Islam & Politics (3rd Ed.) pp. 32-33

[3] Feldman, N., (2008) The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, p. 19

[4] Feldman, N., (2004) After Jihad, pp. 20-21

[5] Hourani, A., (1993) A History of the Arab Peoples,p. 26

[6] El Effendi, A., (2008) Who Needs an Islamic State?(2nd Ed.) p. 82

[7] Hourani, A., op cit. pp. 24-25

[8] Hourani, A., op cit. p. 83

[9] Ed Din, B., Saladin, pp. 61-121

[10] Darwin, J., After Tamerlane, p. 6

[11] Feldman, N., (2004) op. cit. pp. 51-52

[12] Allawi, A., (2009) The Crisis of Islamic Civilization, p. 6

[13] The Koran, ch. 49, verse 10

[14] Baylis al, (2008) The Globalization of World Politics (4th Ed.) p. 11

[15] Baylis, J., op cit. pp. 17-18

[16] The Responsibility to Protect

[17] ICISS (2001) ‘The Responsibility to Protect,’ p. VIII

[18] Baylis, J., op cit. pp. 195

[19] Darwin, J., op cit. pp. 7-8

[20] Gelvin, J., (2010) Political Islam from the Inside Out, p. 125

[21] Soage, A.,  p. 297

[22] Gelvin, J., op cit. p. 125

[23] Feldman, N., (2008) op. cit. p. 112

[24] El Effendi, A., op cit. pp. 44-45

[25] Feldman, N., (2008) op. cit. p. 142

[26] Gelvin, J., (2010) Nationalism, Anarchism, Reform: Political Islam from the Inside Out, p. 126


Essay: Was Europe to Blamed for the Decline of the Ottoman Empire?

This is an essay I wrote in my first year at university. It has not been edited.  

The Islamic state was a vast entity that spread across Asia, Europe, Arabia and Africa. However, there was no one absolute authority over it; instead history records a few fragmented, regional authorities. The most celebrated amongst them was the Ottoman Empire, encompassing the largest stretch of land and a near incontestable authority. During the same era however, in Moorish Spain, Christendom was preparing to declare victory over Islam in the reconquista[1].

Serious military deficiency and fragmented kingdoms encouraged an onslaught in Andalusia. By specialising in the arts, science, intellectual and medicinal reform, Islamic Spain was able to sustain itself and its citizens lavishly. The failure to provide adequate provisions for a military force meant that they were easily overrun. In fact, when Moorish Spain began to diminish they invited the Murabitun[2] to help them. The Turks, on the other hand were undisputed in their knowledge of warfare but their downfall was their inability to reach the academic heights of their Andalusian counterparts. It was as though the emphases between the two had been switched from intellect to military prowess without attempting to create a utopian balance. Despite the lament of Islamists, lessons had not been learnt.

Within a short amount of time in power, they had produced some of the most miraculous feats in Islamic history. In later years, after a series of these incredible successes, there came a period of self induced stagnation and decline.

Is it fair though, to claim that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was self-inflicted? The counter-argument makes reference to the growth of European Empires with superior technology and political prowess. Nevertheless, it was the passive approach of the Islamic empire that facilitated their own demise and the rise of their opponents.

Seeds of Decline

During the infancy of the Ottoman Empire, there is no evidence to suggest that it was challenged by Europe. Generally history dictates that European intervention occurred much later, there was a period of rapid European activity immediately before the official demise of the Islamic state in 1924. Based on that notion it is easy to suggest that the decline was not necessarily induced by European incendiary figures. Furthermore, if it cannot be external forces that caused the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the only remaining possibility is that it was self-induced.

Samuel Huntington suggests that in a uni-polar world the Leviathan[3] can “maintain its dominance over minor states until it is weakened by internal decay.” [pg36]

There are four plausible factors for the eventual decline:

  • Weak leadership
  • Poor administration & governance over provinces
  • Lack of technological progression
  • Internal Corruption

The faults of a hereditary monarchy are clear to see, such a mechanism does not adequately develop natural leaders, it just passes it onto a successor.  Landes adds that the Ottoman Empire initially had strong leaders, however leadership quality rapidly receded within a short amount of time. Sultans were raised without gaining an education in politics or policy and they had instead become largely occupied with the harem. [Landes. 1999]

Similarly, Kinross cites the example of Sultan Abdul Hamid who refused to engage himself with the public in preference of isolation within his palace walls. He adds, “In the past it (the Ottoman Empire) had depended essentially on the absolute sovereign authority of the Sultan and the will and capacity to rule. This its Sultans now generally lacked, prone to the distractions of the harem…No longer was the heir sent to the throne to gain experience in public affairs. No longer-with rare exceptions did a Sultan command his own troops in battle.” [Kinross. 2002]

Most provinces, by default, had been administered weakly with only nominal control. That helped to create an ethnic or regional division within state borders, governance though, was officially under the Ottoman Turks. Strathern claims that the leader in Egypt in latter years became highly ineffectual because the Beys orchestrated governance and had put the governor under virtual house arrest in Cairo. This mattered little to the Ottomans provided there was some semblance of government and no conflict within the province. [Strathern. 2007]

The Hijaz was another district of control but once again, they found great difficulty in garnering control of Najd. When eventually, a challenge to the Ottoman Authority arose, unsurprisingly it came from Najd. Ibn Saud, a staunch supporter of the British (and vice versa), became recognised ruler of the region. These provinces were gradually increased in a short amount of time, providing yet further proof of unsustainable governance. The example suggests that the Ottoman Empire was on the cusp of collapse because of poor management and not having been overrun by foreign forces throughout their history. [Al-Rasheed. 2002]

The Ottomans were hardly known for their pioneering insights into education and invention. Intellectual stagnancy had been embellished further because of European buoyancy. They were incredibly reliant on Christian adversaries for expertise in developing their arsenal. Furthermore, the Ottoman navy was out-dated and incomparable to the rest of Europe. It now meant that their military ascendancy was being undermined, they no longer had the advantage. In 1529 they were defeated in Vienna.

Their clerical body had admonished certain beneficial advancements as heretical innovations which meant that the inventor’s trade was hardly adopted. With such opinions the stifling of progression can easily be placed on the shoulders of the Ulema[4].

They had gradually become isolated in trade as they suffered from their inability to refine raw materials as well as their counterparts. Even in trade, because of their lack of insight to the benefits of technological progress, they suffered. The eastern market had been in huge demand but as Europe developed, the Ottomans failed to maintain the same speed of advancement. The Europeans had become self sufficient, requiring raw materials rather than purchasing products. The tide had turned, the Ottomans went from providing goods to purchasing from Europe. By the time the industrial revolution had arrived, the Ottomans were lagging too far behind to have a significant impact.

After numerous defeats, the ineffectual military unit became a burden and could not accumulate revenues for the state. According to Landes, the empire needed booty or land. When both dried up, they sought to generate wealth from within and some resorted to looting. [Landes. 1999]

The Ottoman Empire had obviously now become very susceptible to losing their provinces and were effectively being torn apart. Italy had taken control in Libya, the Baltic provinces in the late 19th century were also being recaptured by natives [Bruce. 2008]. When Napoleon for example, had consulted the French ambassador regarding invading Egypt, he was received with outright approval and that he might be wise to consider capturing the Ottoman Empire. By this time though, the empire was already considered the sick man of Europe. [Strathern. 2007]

The British, nearly a century later had made significant forays into Ottoman territory and convinced Ibn Saud to declare his independence. The old adage of divide and conquer was coming into effect. Islamists claim that the Ottoman empire and the Islamic state are inter-linked, so when the Islamic state was pronounced dead in 1924, so ended the era of the Ottoman Empire.

There is no doubting the advancement of Europe whilst the Ottoman Empire clicked its heels. Development was being stifled by religious bodies who considered such technological innovations as sacrilegious. Such passiveness had granted their opponents the upper hand. Neither did they choose to invest in education and intellectual advancements even though they had the capacity to do so.

The whole event became cyclical, faced with losses on the battlefield then by a further lack of development on their part and an abundance of technological advancement by their enemies they faced yet more failures in their military campaigns. Ultimately they had fallen foul of their lack of ambition to develop.

There is a finite nature about the empire as experienced by Alexander the Great, Rome and Britain, all at varying lengths of success. Herein lays the issue; internal decay caused the empire to crumble. It was the technological backwardness of the Ottomans that did not allow them to advance and resulted in their opponents being granted a significant advantage. In the chain of events, their military prowess was easily challenged because they never had the know-how of developing much further than the cannon. That led to their main source of revenue being cut-off. The decision to find hired help only fuelled hatred and animosity and so created the potential for mutiny. Corruption ravaged internal politics and once again it had a lasting impact on revenue. They failed to exert any authority in the industrial revolution and were easily stifled when they had ambitions to progress. By the time the Europeans decided to challenge Ottoman authority, the Turks had already exhausted themselves of modern political standing.

The clearest indication that there is a limit on how long an empire can sustain its prolonged assault for world domination is Francis Bacon’s damning verdict,

“We also see that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their first      years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must         have some check or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their latter years to be       superstitious and melancholy; as did Alexander the Great, Diocletian and our         memory of Charles the Fifth and others. For he that is used to go forward, and   findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour and is not the thing he was.” [Bacon, F. 2005]

[1] The reacquisition of Spain by the native Christians.

[2] The Murabitun were skilled fighters who lived in Morocco and the surrounding areas.

[3] Thomas Hobbes referred to the supreme authority as the ‘Leviathan.’

[4] Arabic term for scholars (of Islam).




Al-Rasheed. M. (2002), A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bacon, F. (2008), Of Empire, Penguin Books, London.

Bruce, A. (2003), The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War, John Murray Publishers, London.

Crowley, R. (2005) 1453, Hyperion, New York.

Darwin, J. (2007), After Tamerlane, Penguin Books, London.

Hobbes, T. (2005), Of Man, Penguin Books, London.

Hourani, A. (1993), A History of Arab Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kinross, J.P.D.B. (2002), The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise & Fall of the Turkish Empire, Perennial, New York.

Landes, D. (1999), The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Abacus, London.

Stratern, P. (2007), Napoleon in Egypt, Vintage Books, London.

Journal Articles:

Huntington, S. (1999) ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78/2, pp. 35-49.